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Judicial Reform (Kentucky 1972)
By JUDGE

EARL

T. OsBoRNE*

It has been my experience in a lifetime that spans a half
century that social, economic and governmental problems come
and go much like styles of music or dress. They become popular
and burn with a white heat for a period of time; then they fade
and die. Once gone, few remember whether they were good, bad
or indifferent, or whether or not they were actually solved. The
important thing is that they dimmed and died.
Today, the public has two burning problems which it is determined to solve within the next six months-cleaning up the
country, including the air we breathe (ecology) and reordering
public education (with or without busing). Running a close third
behind these two is court reform. Having spent a good part of
my life in the judiciary I have of late become a little curious concerning the court reform question. In my research I find that in
1906 Dean Roscoe Pound delivered a paper on the subject to the
American Bar Association in which he analyzed step by step the
ills of the judiciary at that time, along with suggested remedies.'
A reading of Dean Pound's speech will clearly demonstrate that
the ills of 1906 are the ills of 1972. Not much has changed in the
past 66 years. With this history of accomplishments behind us
our projection of the future can only be that the ills decried by
Chief Justice Burger in his 1970 annual report to the American
Bar Association at St. Louis will remain with us for some time to
come.
I will not deal at length with the problems inherent in the
federal judiciary. Not being a part of that system, I do not feel
competent to deal with its problems. However, in passing, there
are two areas of difficulty that I think should be recognized. First,
the federal judiciary, along with Congress, has expanded federal
jurisdiction the past twenty-five years so as to bring a flood of
litigation into the federal courts that may really have no business
*Judge, Kentucky Court of Appeals; LL.B. University of Kentucky, 1950.
1 For those who would like to read this report in full see 56 A.B.A.J. 348 (Apr.
1971).
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there.2 Second, while the appointment of federal judges with life
tenure and no adequate means available to discipline or remove
them has on the one hand accomplished a good result by creating
a largely competent independent judiciary, it has also placed
within the system some men who should not be occupying the
bench and are now frozen there to the chagrin of all responsible
jurists.
We in Kentucky are presently operating under a judicial system created by the Constitution of 1891. It provides rigidly for
three levels of courts. The lower courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction; these county, quarterly and magistrate courts are
presided over by men who need not be trained in the legal profession. In the circuit courts, which have general jurisdiction, the
judges must be qualified by legal training and eight years legal
experience and be at least thirty-five years old. There is one
appellate court, the judges of which must have the same qualifications as circuit judges. All judicial officers are elected on a partisan
basis, with cross-filing permitted for circuit and appellate judges.
We follow the common law jury plan of twelve jurors, though
this number may be reduced to six for the trial of minor offenses
in the county, quarterly and magistrate courts. Our jury verdicts
are required to be unanimous only in criminal cases.
On the surface this does not appear to be a bad system. In
order to realize its deficiences one must have considerable knowledge of its internal operations. I will proceed to point out what I
believe to be the major deficiences in Kentucky's present system:
1. There are available sufficient people trained in the law
that we should have no courts presided over by judges
without legal training. The magistrate, county and quarterly court system which was designed to meet the needs
of 1891 should now be abolished and this function placed
in the hands of the circuit courts.
2. The circuit court system should be expanded so as to provide competent personnel in the form of judges (who
would have authority to appoint hearing commissioners)
2 For a history of how this came about see United States ex rel. Elliott v.
Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1954). The Attorneys General of 40 states ified
briefs in an attempt to thwart this expansion of federal power. The Supreme Court
avoided meeting the issue by denying certiorari. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2251
(1964).
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to preside over the trial of cases that now fall within the
jurisdiction of magistrate, county and quarterly courts.
This would embrace what might be called a small claims
court. People should be permitted to appear without counsel and without pleading, insofar as this is possible, and
receive competent judicial treatment of minor disputes and
problems. The cost of these proceedings should be practically nil.
3. Juries for multi-county districts should be selected from
the entire district rather than from a single county. Every
practicing lawyer is aware of the dangers of provincialism
in Kentucky juries.
4. The Court of Appeals should be expanded in order to take
care of the tremendous work load coming to it; as an alternative, there should be instituted an intermediate court
system between the circuit court level and the Court of
Appeals.
5. The selection of judges, both circuit and appellate, should
be removed from the partisan elective system. Here I
would suggest what is commonly referred to as the Missouri plan or some modification thereof. In this modern
day the selection of competent people to fill a judiciary
should be based on something other than a partisan political popularity contest.3
The two tests that any judicial system must meet are those of
quality and quantity. The quantity factor merely means that the
system should dispose of the litigation which is placed before it
within a reasonable length of time. The quality factor means that
the personnel operating the system should be the best qualified
personnel available within the Bar. As the matter now stands,
our system, quantity-wise, is holding up fairly well with the
exception of the Court of Appeals, which is overloaded, and
some of the circuit courts in the larger metropolitan areas. 4
Quality-wise, we are not bringing the better men to the bench
3 The suggested changes which are herein stated have been basically incorporated into two proposed constitutional amendments, one drafted and submitted to the 1972 General Assembly by the Kentucky State Bar Association, the
other by the Kentucky Crime Commission. There has been no legislative action on
the proposals.
4 In 1961 there were 666 cases docketed in the Court of Appeals; by 1970 this
number had increased to 1311.
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for two reasons: First, many highly qualified men do not wish to
be involved in the partisan election system and second, judicial
salaries have not kept pace with pay of comparable members of
the Bar. Also, the fact that the judges of some of our courts need
not have legal training adds to the problem.
The reforms that I have outlined above can only be obtained
through an amendment to our Constitution. For this reason they
may be slow in coming. In any event, the subject of judicial
reform in this jurisdiction cannot now be considered a passing
fad. The needs are too great and the time too short. If something
is not done within the next decade, the system will in some areas
become so inefficient that it will be regarded as practically inoperative.
It is regrettable that much of the current literature on the
subject of judicial reform is so imprecise that there has not jelled
in the minds of the public any concrete idea as to what is really
being proposed. I am sure that the man on the street has vague
visions of the entire system being demolished and replaced by
panels of sociologists and the like. It is also regrettable that much
of the material concerning reform can be interpreted as selfserving in that it seems designed to improve the system for those
who must work in it, viz., better working conditions and higher
salaries for judges, commissioners, administrators, and clerks. If
we are to succeed with meaningful reform our first objective
should be to explain to the public that court reform is for the
benefit of the public who must be served by the system. The
citizen stands to gain because his case in court will be heard by
an independent, competent judge. If tried before a jury, the jury
will be selected from a broad base so that it will not have built
within it prejudices for or against him based on where he lives,
where he goes to church, or the political party of which he might
be a member. His case will be heard within a reasonable period of
time and the expense will not be prohibitive. Once these goals
are explained to the public the task of obtaining reform should be
much easier.

